The Ever-Shrinking Middle Ground: Nelson Rockefeller in the Face of Reaganism by Todd Holmes
1 
 
The Ever-Shrinking Middle Ground: 
Nelson Rockefeller in the Face of Reaganism 
 
By Todd Holmes 
 
Ph.D. Candidate, Department of History 
Yale University 
New Haven, Connecticut 
 
 todd.holmes@yale.edu  
 
© 2011 by Todd Holmes 
 
 
The chants of ―We Want Barry‖ echoed throughout San Francisco‘s Cow Palace arena on 
the afternoon of July 14, 1964, searing the evident shift among the delegates of the National 
Republican Convention as much as the hopes of the New York governor who stood before them.  
Just a few years earlier, Nelson A. Rockefeller (NAR) was considered the unquestionable front-
runner for the 1964 GOP nomination.  By that July afternoon, however, he resided in the 
crosshairs of the conservative Right, attempting to issue a formal repudiation of extremist 
elements that were ―wholly alien to the broad middle course‖ of ―mainstream‖ Republicanism. 
The rightward drift of the party could not have been clearer to Rockefeller.  For amid the 
interrupting chants of ―We Want Barry,‖ he undoubtedly realized that the moderate 
Republicanism he had championed in his public career now stood as isolated as the podium he 
clung to.  Barry Goldwater‘s defeat at the hands of Lyndon Johnson four months later offered 
little vindication for the New York governor. Within a year, new political chants would arise in 
California that further propelled the wave of polarization in the GOP.  Such chants were neither 
from the Right nor directly associated with the heated issues of civil rights, Vietnam, or student 
protests. Rather they were the chants of ―Huelga‖ (strike) led by Cesar Chavez and 
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encompassing a new political issue that would ultimately split the business-labor coalition of 
Rockefeller‘s middle-ground: grapes. 
My research in the political papers of NAR is part of a larger project that uses the strikes 
and boycotts of the United Farm Workers (UFW) as a lens to explore shifts in party politics and 
political economy between 1965 and the early 1980s.  Beginning in September 1965, the UFW 
commenced a movement to organize farm labor in California, which culminated in the 
international grape boycott of 1968-1970.  The success of this early movement spurred the union 
to continue similar activism in other crops nationwide throughout the 1970s and early 1980s in 
its attempt to garner the same rights and protection for farm-workers as those enjoyed by their 
industrial counterparts.  Sitting at the confluences of race, labor, and industry, farm-worker 
activism placed both Democrats and Republicans in a precarious political position—a position 
that refracts new light on party reorganization and political economy during the era.  Within 
Republican ranks—the focus of this essay—the United Farm Worker movement allows us to 
trace this party reorganization in more accurate ways.  Predominately concentrated on the topics 
of Vietnam, civil rights, and the various facets of social conservatism, the historical literature has 
richly charted the conservative ascendance while neglecting the fall of the Republican middle 
ground—a ground held by moderates like Rockefeller.  A look at this middle ground complicates 
the general narrative on the rise of the Right in the literature, demonstrating that the conservative 
ascendance was not a smooth trajectory from Goldwater to Reagan.  Rather it was a contested 
development, as moderates like Rockefeller attempted to maintain a balanced Republicanism that 
embraced corporate liberalism and nourished a business-labor coalition.  The files of NAR and 
his top administrators, Diane Van Wie and George Hinman, offer an invaluable lens of 
examination into the Republican Party of the sixties era, just as Chavez and the UFW provide a 
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penetrating look at political economy in this party reorganization.  Indeed, it was amid the calls 
of ―Huelga‖ that the cresting wave of polarization within the GOP was placed in sharp relief, as 
the middle ground of Rockefeller came eye-to-eye with the conservative landscape of 
Reaganism. 
The United Farm Workers movement had rising implications for agricultural labor 
outside of California, particularly on the Eastern Seaboard.  Beyond the lighted skyline of 
Manhattan, New York stood as one of the nation‘s major agricultural states, producing a bounty 
of fruits, vegetables, and livestock products.  In fact, by the 1960s the Empire State ranked third 
nationally in dairy products, second in apples, and supplemented Eastern markets with an array 
of fresh fruits and vegetables alongside California‘s mammoth production.  To be sure, the 
importance of agriculture was not lost on NAR.  The family had long held an interest in 
agriculture, from its 179-acre Pocantico Hills farm to the host of agricultural-centered programs 
of the Rockefeller Foundation, which paved the way for what was later coined ―the Green 
Revolution.‖  As governor, Rockefeller sought and earned a broad support of New York 
business, which just as much included those operating in the fields and orchards as those under 
the skyline of Manhattan.  Yet, Rockefeller was also concern about agricultural labor.  As early 
as 1964, the governor‘s Interdepartmental Committee on Farm Labor issued a report detailing the 
number of programs provided for the 50,000 migrant farm-workers annually employed in the 
fields and orchards of the Empire State.  Such reforms included health and childcare services, 
housing, education, and a state standard for agricultural working conditions.  ―The seasonal 
worker is a key figure in the State‘s agricultural economy,‖ Rockefeller asserted in the report‘s 
introduction, ―and the State of New York aims to treat him well.‖   
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The governor‘s public concern for farm-workers fit squarely within the middle ground of 
moderate Republicanism.  Throughout his governorship, he championed business friendly 
policies alongside an array of state funded social programs, placing New York largely at the 
forefront in the areas of housing, public education, healthcare, and environmental reform.  
Moreover, as one of the earliest Republicans to actively support civil rights, Rockefeller‘s 
programs stood untainted by racial and gender discrimination, while the governor himself 
advanced an affirmative action program that led to a dramatic increase of women and minorities 
employed in state government.  NAR‘s middle ground also included labor, as he garnered the 
long-time support of the AFL-CIO and pledged to ―fight any effort to alter the historic position 
of the Republican Party…in opposition to a so-called ‗right-to-work‘ law.‖  Indeed, the moderate 
Republicanism of the New York governor rested on a diverse coalition.  Yet, what remained of 
this middle ground within the national ranks of the GOP after the Goldwater onslaught stood to 
face another challenge emanating from California by 1966.  
  Four months after over three thousand farm-workers joined Cesar Chavez and his 
fledgling union in a strike and boycott against two of California‘s corporate grape growers, 
Ronald Reagan formally announced his candidacy for the governorship against two-term 
Democratic incumbent Edmund ―Pat‖ Brown.  Reagan‘s public career had plodded a path of 
paradox in the preceding decade, as the former actor and president of the Screen Actors Guild 
became the corporate spokesman for General Electric, championing a laissez-faire message of 
anti-communism and anti-labor.  In fact, Reagan wasted no time indicating his stance on the 
farm labor situation erupting in California during his speech.  Holding up a catsup bottle, the 
Republican challenger warned that there would be ―28 million fewer of these manufactured . . . 
[when] the Secretary of Labor and our own state government finish their experiments in reform 
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among farm-workers and completely cancel out the Bracero program.‖  Terminated without 
renewal months before, the bi-national program between Mexico and the U.S. had ushered in 
some four million Mexican workers into the nation‘s agricultural fields during its twenty-three 
year tenure, supplying American agribusiness—in California as well as New York—with an 
army of cheap, malleable labor.  Indeed, the precipitous drop in cheap foreign workers that 
resulted from the program‘s demise opened the door for Chavez‘s organizational efforts.  So too 
did it raise the concern of agribusiness and the corporate backers of Ronald Reagan.  For 
underpinning Reagan‘s criticisms of the program‘s cancelation was not as much alarm over labor 
scarcity as it was worker unionism and the UFW.    
Rockefeller himself had plodded a fine path between New York agriculture and 
organized labor since coming to office.  In his 1964 campaign literature, migrant labor stood as 
an import addendum to pamphlets that touted the governor‘s labor track record, noting that 
Rocky had not only ―been a friend and supporter of responsible free trade unionism,‖ but also 
under his tenure ―migrant farm workers were guaranteed greater wage protection and better 
housing and working conditions.‖  Yet, in an interview with the San Francisco Monitor, the 
governor avoided inquiries about if he favored renewal of the Bracero Program, stating that since 
the chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture ―does not intend to sponsor the legislation 
authorizing renewal of the Bracero Program…there is no prospect for renewal.‖  To be sure, 
Rockefeller‘s evasion represented more than just the adroit tact of a seasoned politician.  For 
while touting that ―the plight of migrant farm workers is of deep concern to every American,‖ 
the governor‘s tepid words underscored the volatility of the farm labor issue, and how such 
―concern‖ could upset the fragile political balance of the middle ground.  Like many moderates 
on both sides of political aisle, Rockefeller most likely wished farm labor issues—heightened by 
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UFW activism—could be resolved without pulling New York into its orbit of controversy, and 
thus maintaining the moderate coalition of business and labor.  
On the West Coast, however, aspirations for such a coalition were quickly disappearing 
as UFW activism collided with the state‘s gubernatorial race to create a prevailing wind of 
polarization on the California political landscape.  NAR himself had warned the country against 
this emerging trend, appearing on television in 1964 to denounce the ―effort[s] of right-wing 
extremists to turn the Republican Party away from its traditional path of moderation‖—efforts 
―nowhere…more intense than in the State of California.‖  Indeed, the Berkeley Free Speech 
Movement and Watts Riots of the following year further fueled these efforts, while also creating 
a host of pitfalls for moderates like Governor Brown and Republican hopeful George 
Christopher.  Yet as Watts and Berkeley quickly became the litmus tests for the social issues of 
race and sixties activism, it was the UFW and its challenge to California‘s primary industry that 
placed the vital tenets of the moderate business–labor coalition at political risk.  And just as 
Ronald Reagan quickly capitalized on Watts and Berkeley, he seized upon the farm labor issued 
and the timidity it received from both Brown and Christopher.  He denounced the cancelation of 
the Bracero Program and the increased federal regulation of Mexican guest workers as a 
―ridiculous experiment that made farmers in California sociological guinea pigs.‖  Moderates 
like Brown and Christopher stewed in silence.  As Cesar Chavez and the UFW completed a 300-
mile march to Sacramento on Easter Sunday, Reagan noted the absence of prominent politicians 
while also criticizing the march as an ―Easter egg roll…of professional bleeding hearts.‖  By the 
summer of 1966, the rising activism of the UFW had placed an important demarcation on 
California‘s political table, making the entities of business and labor no longer part of a moderate 
coalition, but rather a political decision between one or the other.  Pat Brown and George 
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Christopher desperately tried to cling to the middle ground and garner the support of both.  
Ronald Reagan made his position (and that eventually of the Republican Party) clear—he was 
choosing business. 
In the midst of his own successful reelection campaign, NAR kept a critical eye on 
Reagan and California, as seen in the correspondence of his long-time advisor George Hinman.  
A month after Reagan announced his candidacy, the Rockefeller Administration celebrated 
George Christopher‘s run for the governor‘s seat, ―the moderate representation in the California 
primary‖ Hinman trumpeted, ―and of course we hope he can prevail.‖  The last Republican 
mayor of San Francisco, Christopher fit squarely within the moderate mold of Rockefeller 
Republicanism, championing a host of reform initiatives, urban renewal programs, and a strong 
civil rights stand during his two-term tenure.  Over the months, Rockefeller and his advisors 
continued to be ―intensely interested in how the primary is developing for George Christopher,‖ 
only to have their hopes dashed as the winds of polarization blew much stronger in Reagan‘s 
favor than that of the San Francisco Mayor.  ―We of course were greatly disappointed with the 
result in California,‖ Hinman conceded after the June primary, ―things are certainly moving to 
the right out there in a most depressing way.‖  Contrary to the celebratory image often invoked 
of Reagan leading bewildered Republicans from the wilderness, moderates like Rockefeller and 
Hinman cringed at the news of Reagan‘s primary victory and the thought of him as governor.  ―I 
know what a cruel dilemma Reagan‘s nomination put you in…I know how deeply you feel about 
Reagan, feelings which I share‖ Hinman confided to San Francisco Republican and Rockefeller 
supporter Bill Brinton, concluding that the ―best of a very bad situation would be for the 
moderates to try to use their leverage now that Reagan needs their support.‖  Many moderates 
felt the ―cruel dilemma‖ which Hinman discussed, especially in light of what became known that 
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year as the Eleventh Commandment — thou shalt not speak ill of any fellow Republican.  
Covering the governor‘s right flank with the 1968 presidential primary in calculation, Hinman 
adhered to the commandment when writing to Reagan supporters such as Jeremiah Sullivan of 
Crocker National Bank, U.S. District Judge Thurmond Clarke, and Marco Hellman whose 
corporate links included Wells Fargo Bank and Twentieth Century Fox.  To these conservative 
party loyalists Hinman gushed with enthusiasm, extending congratulations on behalf of 
Rockefeller regarding Reagan‘s ―smashing victory.‖  
The Eleventh Commandment, however, did not preclude helping a fellow Republican‘s 
opponent, which as a 1966 correspondence from Pat Brown thanking the New York governor for 
―his fine campaign advice” suggests, is exactly what NAR did in his attempt to salvage the 
middle ground.  While the historical record remains unclear regarding the level and type of aid 
Rockefeller provided to the California incumbent, it nonetheless highlights the fact that outside 
party identity Rockefeller was much more akin politically to Pat Brown than to Ronald Reagan.  
Indeed, Brown was an adherent to the middle ground.  During his eight-year tenure, he enacted a 
host of state-funded social and educational programs, was a strong advocate for civil rights, and 
nurtured the moderate business – labor coalition.  So too, did Brown adroitly plod a fine path 
between California agribusiness and farm labor.  Yet by 1966, the middle ground of California 
had already begun to fracture amid the polarizing winds of the previous two years.  For just as 
Ronald Reagan chose business during the campaign, the array of social activism—especially that 
of the UFW—forced Pat Brown to hang his electoral hat on the pegs of civil rights and labor, as 
the governor finally extended public support to Cesar Chavez and the UFW by summer‘s end.  
Neither the union‘s ―Viva Pat Brown‖ endorsement, nor Rockefeller‘s help, proved enough to 
buoy Brown‘s sinking ticket.  Reagan‘s landslide victory of almost a million votes in the 
9 
 
November election surely illustrated how effectively he tapped into the anxieties of the state‘s 
white majority, most notably seen in the heated issues of Proposition 14, Watts, and Berkeley.  
Often missed in this social focus of the conservative ascendance, however, is how thoroughly 
California‘s corporate giants swarmed into the camp of Reagan and the Republican Party — an 
event not lost on the moderates of both parties.  If Brown‘s defeat revealed anything, it was the 
changing political currents of business and the steady erosion of the middle ground.   
In the wake of Reagan‘s victory, Rockefeller and his advisors continued to espouse hopes 
of moderation.  ―We too have very mixed feelings about the result out there,‖ George Hinman 
confided to one California associate, ―but I believe the realities of governing a state of the size 
and complexity of California will have a moderating effect… [at least] I very much hope so.‖  In 
more blunt fashion, Hinman expressed the views of the Rockefeller Administration to friend Sid 
Levine: ―We are all hoping that things will work out better than we have anticipated in 
California…‖  To the chagrin of Rockefeller moderates, as well as Chavez and the farm-workers, 
such hopes of moderation never materialized.  Accompanying the new governor to Sacramento 
in 1967 were the corporate backers that had guided and funded Reagan‘s political career since 
the summer of 1965.  Called the ―Kitchen Cabinet,‖ this group of corporate conservatives 
proceeded to set up the Reagan Administration in California, selecting the top forty positions in 
the administration largely from the boardrooms of the Golden State.  As George Hinman noted in 
a report to NAR, ―Reagan has leaned heavily on business for appointments to various regulatory 
positions in which business has a position of interest.‖  Indeed, the appointments in agriculture—
California‘s primary industry—proved no different.  Earl Coke, the former agricultural vice 
president of Bank of America, received the appointment as the State Director of Agriculture, 
while Allen Grant, a Visalia farmer and president of the California Farm Bureau Federation, 
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agreed to head the State Board of Agriculture.  Next, the ―Kitchen Cabinet‖ named fourteen 
growers to run the state‘s Farm Placement Service—the agency in charge of working with the 
U.S. Department of Labor to supply Mexican guest workers during certified shortages.   And just 
as one would expect from this make up, the corporate conservatism of the Reagan 
Administration was all business, and no labor.  The strikes and activism of the UFW had scored 
some success throughout 1966 and 1967, gaining a handful of contracts among California grape 
growers.  Yet, Chavez and the farm-workers soon faced a virulence of opposition from the new 
governor, as Reagan not only publicly condemned the union‘s movement, but ordered the use of 
prison labor and welfare recipients as strike breakers.  As Hinman reported to Rockefeller, 
Reagan has ―taken an anti-farm labor position — one in support of farm owners exclusively.‖   
The corporate conservatism taking shape under Reagan — the pro-business, anti-labor 
statism — was something far afield from the middle ground Rockefeller and other moderates 
politically envisioned for both the GOP and nation.  Indeed, it was this conflict of visions that 
kept high profile Republican moderates like Rockefeller and California Senator Thomas Kuchel 
from publicly endorsing Reagan during the 1966 campaign.  And it was this conflict George 
Hinman sought to highlight in his research on the prospective 1968 presidential candidates.  
Hinman‘s research files resemble an important source of political analysis, laying out both the 
top Democratic and Republican candidates via their positions on (among other issues) 
agriculture, labor management, civil rights, and Vietnam.  In this spectrum, two significant 
developments become clear: NAR‘s moderate position and the shrinking of this middle ground 
amid intense party polarization on both sides, as seen with McCarthy, Kennedy, and Humphrey 
on the Left and, especially, Ronald Reagan on the Right.  In fact, Hinman‘s files indicate that the 
two Republican governors saw eye-to-eye on very little.  On Vietnam, Rockefeller opposed 
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further escalation while Reagan voiced ―no confidence‖ in a peace settlement and championed 
an escalate-and-finish strategy.  Reagan advocated a similar strategy on the home front regarding 
riots and student protests, advocating firm and swift repression in contrast to Rockefeller‘s call 
for peaceful demonstrations and a more nuanced understanding among office holders regarding 
the arguments and root causes of such dissent.  Civil rights represented another issue of contrast, 
where in juxtaposing the two Republicans Hinman labeled Reagan the ―least pro-civil rights of 
the candidates,‖ noting his opposition to national open housing, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act.            
Yet these issues aside, Hinman‘s files consistently highlight political economy as the 
biggest separation between Rockefeller‘s middle ground and the emerging political landscape of 
Reaganism.  In stark contrast to Rockefeller‘s promotion of social programs for the poor and 
strong support of organized labor, Reagan characterized welfare as a ―$50 billion failure‖ and 
often displayed a vociferous anti-labor position.  He advocated anti-trust provisions be applied to 
unions and publicly stated that the criticisms of labor leaders on the use of prison inmates in 
California fields ―remind me of a dog sitting on a sharp rock howling with pain who is too stupid 
to get up.‖  While Reagan‘s anti-labor position may have not represented something novel for the 
fledgling Conservative Right, his dealings with business certainly broke new ground.  In a 1964 
report on Barry Goldwater, Hinman warned Rockefeller that in regards to the Arizona senator‘s 
record on small business, ―no attack can be made in this area.‖  Such was not the case for 
Reagan, as Hinman‘s files repeatedly link the California governor to the corporate order.  His 
appointments to the state‘s Public Utility Commission (PUC) offered a lucid case in point—one 
well documented by Rockefeller‘s team.  Established by progressive Republican Hiram Johnson 
in 1911 to provide customer-oriented regulation, the PUC under Reagan became filled, as 
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Hinman observed, with ―candidates approved by the industry that is supposed to be regulated.‖  
Indeed, the composition of PUC represented a boon for business.  The rate increase petition filed 
with the commission by AT&T‘s Pacific Coast subsidiary (PT&T), for example, skyrocketed 
from $6 million in 1966 to $181 million after the election and appointments of Ronald Reagan.  
NAR‘s research team documented similar pro-corporate actions, noting the appointment of 
businessmen to the positions of Labor Commissioner, head of California‘s Department of 
Industrial Relations, and the State Industrial Accidents and Workmen‘s Compensation Appeal 
Board.  It was within this corporate context of Reagan that Rockefeller‘s administration began to 
view the farm-worker movement in California, charging the new governor was ―solely defending 
California‘s large farm owners‖ and that both his approval of prison labor and opposition to the 
UFW was all ―in order to provide the big farmers with cheap labor.‖ 
By the early months of 1968, Rockefeller could no longer avoid the UFW‘s orbit of 
controversy, nor the contrasting political currents that separated the landscape of Reaganism and 
the middle ground he hoped to maintain.  Just as the various presidential primary campaigns 
kicked off around the country, Cesar Chavez announced a national boycott of California grapes.  
And topping the list of the forty cities the union targeted was none other than New York City—a 
target that ultimately put Rockefeller moderates in direct conflict with Reagan.  The UFW‘s 
boycott surged with success in New York City, cutting grape purchases by 98% and garnering 
the public support of Republican Mayor John Lindsay.  The announcement of support, which 
promised to cut all city purchases of California grapes, originally came from Deputy Mayor 
Timothy W. Costello.  In a June 6 press conference, Reagan attempted to downplay the 
announcement, stating that he spoke to Mayor Lindsey who ―wasn‘t aware that his Deputy 
Mayor had made that statement.‖  Yet, to the chagrin of Reagan, Lindsey never disavowed the 
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action, and in fact remained listed as a supporter of the UFW for at least the next four years.  By 
July, the telegrams emanating from Reagan‘s office, which also served as press releases, 
contained a heightened tone of both disapproval and political pressure.  ―Governor Reagan has 
asked me to repeat what he told you on the telephone,‖ Secretary William Clark wrote to 
Lindsey, ―that he is hopeful that the action on the part of your deputy mayor will not result in 
retaliatory legislation on the part of the California State Legislature which is still in session.‖  
Clark sent a similar public telegram to Rockefeller, informing him ―Governor Reagan…regrets 
such hasty action on the part of the City of New York without prior consultation,‖ adding that ―it 
seems to us highly unwise for government entities to become involved in this boycott action.‖   
Rockefeller met Reagan‘s threats and criticism with the calculated strategy of silence.  
Like the Bracero Program controversy years earlier, Rockefeller continued to plod carefully 
between agriculture and labor, and with his eye on the 1968 election adroitly avoided direct 
involvement in the emerging UFW controversy.  To be sure, the silence of the New York 
governor aimed at maintaining the middle ground, and thus the support of agribusiness in the 
Empire State.  Yet, his silence also bespoke to the actions already taken by other moderates.  In 
short, Rockefeller did not speak out because he did not need to.  Lindsey‘s support of Chavez 
and the UFW through the city government of New York helped advance the union‘s cause 
exponentially—favorable action taken by at least sixteen other mayors around the country.  
Similarly, moderate Republican senators like Jacob Javits of New York and Thomas Kuchel of 
California advocated such support for farm-workers on the federal level, arguing for the 
recognition of the UFW and the extension of collective bargaining rights to agricultural labor.  
Rockefeller‘s silence, moreover, is further contextualized politically when juxtaposed against the 
heightened rhetoric of his two Republican rivals, Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon.  Together 
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on the California leg of the Nixon ‘68 campaign, Nixon and Reagan publicly ate grapes at stops 
in San Francisco and California‘s Central Valley, characterizing the UFW‘s boycott as ―illegal,‖ 
―immoral,‖ and nothing more than ―attempted blackmail.‖  NAR, by contrast, saved his 
criticisms for Richard Nixon when making his own campaign debut in San Francisco, 
lamenting—once again—the extreme right turn of the GOP in regard to both labor management 
and Vietnam.  Indeed, the crumbling moderate business – labor coalition represented a primary 
concern of Rockefeller, as seen that year in the New York City garbage strike.  Taking on his 
moderate colleague, Mayor John Lindsey, the governor refused proposals to call in the National 
Guard and successfully push forward negotiations between sanitation workers and the city, 
earning praise from the AFL-CIO while ultimately cowing Lindsey into admitting he was 
―mistaken.‖ 
In 1969, the chasm between Rockefeller‘s middle ground and the mounting Reaganism of 
the GOP widened further.  California Senator George Murphy submitted federal legislation—
trumpeted approvingly by Reagan—that would outlaw strikes and boycotts in agriculture, and as 
critics observed, undercut any hope of farm labor organization.  The newly elected President 
Nixon contributed his own touch to this anti-labor trajectory, increasing U.S. grape shipments to 
Vietnam by 350%.  And in California, the Reagan Administration spearheaded the anti-UFW 
boycott campaign funded by agribusiness through the State Department of Agriculture.   On the 
other side of the rising anti-labor divide, Rockefeller celebrated the publication of the first annual 
report of the New York State Interdepartmental Committee on Migrant Labor.  Initiated by the 
New York Governor in April 1968 to ―improve the lot of migrant workers,‖ the Committee 
represented Rockefeller‘s attempt to mediate and maintain a road of cooperation between 
agricultural producers and farm labor.  ―Agricultural employees have historically been exempted 
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from many of the protections provided industrial workers,‖ Rockefeller wrote in the report‘s 
preface, ―it is essential that we make every effort to now effectively reach the migrant.‖  The 
following month, NAR also submitted his own Farm Labor Bill to the New York Legislature, 
which provided a progressive minimum wage, stronger enforcement of health and safety 
regulations in both migrant housing and work environment, as well as a system of 
unemployment insurance.  While neither Rockefeller‘s Farm Labor Bill nor his Committee‘s 
report advocated collective bargaining for agricultural labor, the government documents—like 
the governor who signed them—surely embodied the moderate essence of the middle ground, 
embracing an inclusive view of labor management that could not have differed more from the 
conservative ethos of Reaganism.  In the decade that followed, both this perspective and 
Rockefeller‘s middle ground that gave life to the moderate business-labor coalition, would lay 
extinct in the political landscape of the GOP.   
Rockefeller once observed, ―Politics is a kaleidoscope of constantly changing 
relationships.‖  Indeed, few quotes ring more true in regard to the rise of Reaganism and the 
erosion of Rockefeller‘s moderate Republicanism during the sixties era.  In 1970, NAR ran 
successfully for reelection in what perhaps was one of the last moderate campaigns of the 
Republican middle ground.  In July of the same year, Cesar Chavez and the UFW celebrated 
unprecedented victory, garnering contracts that ultimately covered some 98% of California grape 
growers, and earning collective bargaining recognition for farm-workers.  Amid the celebration, 
however, few noticed how the union‘s movement helped propel (and highlight) the wave of 
polarization within U.S. party politics, which forever changed those very political relationships 
— namely labor and business — Rockefeller discussed.  Within a decade, the UFW‘s victory —
like Rockefeller‘s middle ground — would prove to be both an aberration on, and casualty of, 
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the expanding landscape of Reaganism.  Historians in recent years have sought to highlight 
Rockefeller‘s late adaptation to this political environment, noting his ―right turn‖ during the 
1970s as seen in the Attica Prison riots, drug legislation, and his law and order rhetoric.  Yet like 
the emphasis on social politics in the conservative ascendance, this same focus regarding 
Rockefeller misses the crux of the middle ground—the business-labor coalition—and his 
unsuccessful fight to maintain this moderate balance in the face of Reaganism.  Nothing proved 
more devastating to the politics of moderation within the GOP than this shift of political 
economy.  Taken together with the heated social issues of race and New Left activism, we can 
see the full spectrum of party polarization, and through the political career of NAR, the ever-
shrinking middle ground of American politics.                  
I am so grateful for the opportunity to have been a grant-in-aid recipient at the 
Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) and therefore I would like to thank the RAC for its generous 
support, and to especially extend my gratitude to Mary Ann Quinn, Tom Rosenbaum and 
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